GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY OF ORBÁN: FROM REFORMIST PLANS TO CRISIS CONSEQUENCES

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31732/2663-2209-2026-82-28-43

Keywords:

Hungary, Orbán's economic policy, budget deficit, public debt, inflation, corruption, economic crisis, Ukrainian-Hungarian relations

Abstract

Hungary under Viktor Orbán has become one of the most debated examples of non-orthodox economic policy in contemporary Europe. The Fidesz government presented its model as a sovereign alternative to the neoliberal mainstream, combining state interventionism, economic nationalism, sectoral taxation, support for “national capital,” and a confrontational approach toward the European Union. The objective of the article is to examine comprehensively the evolution of Viktor Orbán’s governmental economic policy from its reformist beginning in 2010 to the crisis outcomes that emerged before the political transition of 2026, as well as to assess the prospects for Hungary’s economic recovery after the change of government. The study applies systemic, comparative, statistical, and content analysis, as well as the case-study method. The empirical basis includes data from KSH, Eurostat, the IMF, the World Bank, European Commission reports, and analytical publications of international research institutions. The study shows that the initial success of “Orbánomics” was driven less by the internal efficiency of the model than by the combination of external resources, including EU funds, cheap energy, low interest rates, and post-crisis economic recovery. At the same time, the model gradually generated structural vulnerabilities: institutional centralization, rent redistribution through politically connected business groups, dependence on external financing, inflationary instability, weak innovation-oriented modernization, deterioration of the investment climate, and growing tensions with the European Union. “Orbánomics” demonstrated the capacity of a right-wing populist economic model to secure short-term political legitimacy and apparent stabilization. However, in the long run, it produced macroeconomic instability, institutional exhaustion, weakened competitiveness, and increased vulnerability to external shocks. The Hungarian case confirms that economic growth without institutional quality and transparent governance is unlikely to be sustainable. Further studies should focus on the quantitative assessment of the impact of frozen EU funds on SMEs, regional development, investment activity, and public finances. Comparative research on Hungary and other right-wing populist economic models in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and South Asia is also needed.

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Author Biographies

Dmytro Ivanovych Tkach, KROK University

Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor at the Department of Journalism, KROK University,  Kyiv, Ukraine

Dmytro Kostiantynovych Tkach, G.M. Dobrov Institute for Scientific and Technological Potential and Science History Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Research Fellow, Center for Innovation and Technological Development, State Institution “G.M. Dobrov Institute for Scientific and Technological Potential and Science History Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,” Kyiv, Ukraine

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Published

2026-05-30

How to Cite

Tkach, D. I., & Tkach, D. K. (2026). GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY OF ORBÁN: FROM REFORMIST PLANS TO CRISIS CONSEQUENCES. Science Notes of KROK University, (2(82), 28–43. https://doi.org/10.31732/2663-2209-2026-82-28-43

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