

УДК 159.9:1 + 159.964.2 + 611.82
DOI: 10.31732/2663-2209-2025-80-422-431

Дата надходження: 20.11.2025
Дата прийняття до друку: 17.12.2025
Дата публікації: 30.12.2025



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НЕЙРОБІОЛОГІЯ ТА ЕКЗИСТЕНЦІЙНИЙ ВИКЛИК У ФЕНОМЕНІ «ВТРАЧЕНОЇ ІДЕЇ»

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NEUROBIOLOGY AND THE EXISTENTIAL CHALLENGE IN THE PHENOMENON OF THE "LOST IDEA"

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Анотація. У статті досліджується феномен «втраченої ідеї» як багатовимірне психонейроекзистенційне явище, що поєднує когнітивні, психологічні, психоаналітичні та філософські аспекти людського досвіду. Ситуація гострого переживання втрати власної думки розглядається не як короточасний когнітивний збій, а як момент глибокого зіткнення ідентичності з межами самосвідомості. У статті аналізується механіка цього феномена на трьох рівнях (нейробіологічному, психологічному та екзистенційному) з опорою на сучасні пояснювальні моделі пам'яті, захисних механізмів психіки та смислотворення.

Показано, що забування не означає знищення інформації, а є наслідком блокування доступу до нейронного ансамблю, спричиненого контекстною зміною або внутрішнім конфліктом значень. На психологічному рівні це прояв захисної реакції психіки, що перешкоджає появі думок, здатних порушити стабільність «Я» або спровокувати етичну, ціннісну чи ідентифікаційну кризу. На екзистенційному рівні «втрата ідеї» інтерпретується як символічна втрата авторства над власною свідомістю – зіткнення з питанням, чи є думка продуктом «Я», чи проявом ширшого смислового поля.

Метою дослідження є обґрунтування тези, що біль від втрати ідеї виникає не через зникнення змісту, а через втрату потенційної версії себе, пов'язаної з цією думкою. Методологія поєднує феноменологічний опис, нейрокогнітивні моделі пам'яті, психоаналітичну інтерпретацію витіснення та екзистенційно-філософський аналіз авторства мислення. Застосований міждисциплінарний підхід дозволяє розкрити, що спроба «згадати» – це не реконструкція змісту, а акт відновлення цілісності особистісного досвіду.

Результати дослідження свідчать про потребу змінити підхід: замість механічного відтворення – усвідомлення і переосмислення. Втрата ідеї – це не помилка пам'яті, а внутрішній захисний і водночас трансформаційний процес, що відкриває можливість оновлення ідентичності. У статті запропоновано перейти від спроби «пригадати» до здатності «визнати і пересотворити» – як спосіб інтегрувати втрачене у глибший процес особистісного розвитку і пошуку сенсу.

Ключові слова: феномен втраченої ідеї, пригадування, усвідомлення, переосмислення, трансформація.

Формули: 0; рис.: 1; табл.: 1, бібл.: 11

Abstract. The article explores the phenomenon of the "lost idea" as a multidimensional psychoneuro-existential occurrence that integrates cognitive, psychological, psychoanalytic, and philosophical aspects of human experience. The situation of an acute experience of losing one's own thought is considered not as a transient cognitive failure, but as a moment of profound confrontation of identity with the limits of self-awareness. The article analyses the mechanics of this phenomenon on three levels – neurobiological, psychological, and existential – drawing upon contemporary explanatory models of memory, psychological defence mechanisms, and meaning-making.

It is demonstrated that forgetting does not signify the destruction of information but rather results from the blocking of access to a neural ensemble, induced by a contextual shift or an internal conflict of meanings. At the psychological level, this represents a defensive reaction of the psyche that prevents the emergence of thoughts capable of disrupting the stability of the 'Self' or provoking an ethical, axiological, or identificatory crisis. On the existential level,

the “loss of an idea” is interpreted as a symbolic loss of authorship over one’s own consciousness – a confrontation with the question of whether thought is a product of the ‘Self’ or a manifestation of a broader semantic field.

The aim of the study is to substantiate the thesis that the pain of losing an idea arises not from the disappearance of its content, but from the loss of a potential version of the self associated with that thought. The methodology combines phenomenological description, neurocognitive models of memory, psychoanalytic interpretation of repression, and existential-philosophical analysis of the authorship of thinking. The applied interdisciplinary approach reveals that the attempt to “remember” is not a reconstruction of content, but an act of restoring the integrity of personal experience.

The findings of the study indicate the necessity of a shift in approach: from mechanical reproduction to awareness and re-interpretation. The loss of an idea is not a failure of memory but an internal defensive and, at the same time, transformative process that opens the possibility of renewing one’s identity. The article proposes a transition from the attempt to “recall” to the capacity to “acknowledge and re-create” – as a means of integrating what has been lost into a deeper process of personal development and the search for meaning.

Keywords: *the phenomenon of the “lost idea”, recollection, awareness, re-interpretation, transformation.*

Formulas:0; fig.: 1; tab.: 1; bibl.:11

Statement of the Problem. The phenomenon of the “lost idea” (a sudden, inexplicable loss of a thought that was just present in consciousness) still lacks a comprehensive explanation. In cognitive science, it is interpreted as a failure of working memory or a consequence of contextual switching; in psychology, as a manifestation of stress, overload, or inattention. However, none of these models account for why some losses are experienced so acutely that they provoke existential anxiety, doubt regarding one’s authorship, and a sense of the loss of meaning in thinking itself. The individual is not merely irritated – they are devastated, as if a part of themselves has been lost. Conventional advice, such as “recall the context”, “switch tasks,” or “relax,” often proves ineffective, and may even exacerbate internal resistance, as it fails to consider the ontological depth of the event. The loss of an idea is not merely a cognitive failure, but a disruption of the integrity of the thinking ‘Self’, affecting one’s conception of oneself as a subject, author, and bearer of meaning. For this reason, the problem lies at the intersection of three disciplines: neuroscience (which describes the mechanics of memory), psychology (which examines the defensive mechanisms of the psyche), and philosophy (which raises questions concerning the nature of thought, authorship, and subjectivity). Its comprehension requires a new interdisciplinary framework, capable not only of explaining but also of re-interpreting forgetting as an event with existential and ontological significance.

Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. Recent publications confirm that the phenomenon of “idea loss” or “thought loss” extends far beyond a purely cognitive explanation. In neuroscience, it is associated with the effects of contextual switching (the doorway effect) and the theory of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), which account for the loss of access to information but do not capture the depth of the internal experience. In psychoanalytic works (Jung, 1959; Lacan, 1966), forgetting is interpreted as repression – a defensive reaction of the psyche to an idea that threatens the integrity of the “Self”. Existential psychology (Frankl, 1946; Yalom, 1980) considers the loss of a thought as an encounter with the void – a moment that purifies, halts, and simultaneously opens a space for new meaning.

Contemporary empirical research is of particular significance, demonstrating that forgetting may not be a defect, but an adaptive event. For example, Synhaivska & Sokur (2025) show that successful psychological rehabilitation following traumatic experience depends not only on memory, but also on the capacity for meaning-making, self-acceptance, and the integration of the unassimilated. This confirms that forgetting is not merely a loss, but a form of internal gesture with therapeutic, philosophical, and transformative potential.

Relevance of the Study. At the current stage of development in the humanities, there exists a methodological gap between the neurobiological explanation of forgetting mechanisms and the psychological-existential understanding of its meaning. The

phenomenon of the “lost idea” (the sudden loss of a thought that was just present in consciousness) manifests not merely as a cognitive failure, but as an event affecting the structure of identity, authorship, and self-perception. Its experience is accompanied not by irritation, but by profound anxiety, indicating the ontological significance of this process. Such multidimensionality necessitates an integrative approach capable of combining neuroscientific models, psychoanalytic concepts of repression, and an existential understanding of thinking as an event of being. The relevance of the study is determined by the need to reinterpret forgetting not as a deficit, but as an internal transition – a liminal state that opens the possibility for the transformation of the “Self”.

Formulation of the Research Aim and Methods. The aim of the study is to examine the phenomenon of “thought loss” as a complex psychic occurrence, integrating neurobiological mechanisms, psychological defence responses, and existential anxiety. The disappearance of a thought is viewed not as a memory error, but as a significant event revealing the boundary between stability and transformation of consciousness. The research hypothesis posits that the distress caused by the loss of an idea arises not from the loss of content, but from the loss of a potential version of the self associated with that thought. The attempt to recall represents an unconscious act of the Ego’s struggle for control, exposing an internal conflict between the drive for development and the fear of change.

The research methodology is based on an interdisciplinary approach, combining:

- a phenomenological description of the subjective felt experience of thought loss;
- cognitive models of memory and contextual switching;
- a psychoanalytic interpretation of repression and the Unconscious;
- a philosophical-existential analysis of the authorship of thought and the nature of the idea.

This approach allows forgetting to be considered not as a disruption, but as a symbolic gesture of the psyche, opening the

way to the renewal of identity through meaning-making.

Presentation of the Main Research Material. An idea or thought arises like a spark – a momentary convergence of billions of neural potentials suddenly merging into a sense of meaning. At this instant, consciousness attains a peculiar insight: from chaos emerges form, and the individual experiences a brief sense of authorship – “this is my idea.” Yet the neurobiological reality of this event is extremely fragile. Working memory, this temporary workspace for mental constructions, is not designed for retention, but merely for holding. It resembles the surface of water, upon which thought is reflected before a wave of external stimulation shatters the reflection.

From the perspective of contemporary cognitive science, consciousness is not a repository, but a dynamic space of temporary attention, in which each fragment of experience competes for survival. What we call “forgetting” is often not erasure, but repression into deeper layers of neural dynamics – into zones where access to an idea is temporarily lost. According to the theory of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), each thought constitutes a trajectory within the network of associations. If this trajectory is suddenly interrupted, the idea does not disappear, but enters a latent state: it remains within the system, yet loses its point of entry. Consciousness finds itself in a state of searching without orientation – as if seeking a door that was just open but has now vanished. The brain does not betray us; it merely readjusts the pathways of energetic flow, striving to maintain equilibrium between excess and tension, between preservation and renewal. This process can be compared to the “doorway effect”: when an individual moves from one room to another, their working memory appears to reset, freeing space for the new context. At the moment we become distracted, a thought is “archived” – not destroyed, but seemingly “folded” into the depths, where access to it requires not volition, but a return to a previous state of consciousness. We attempt to recall, yet our

consciousness is already altered, and the pathway to the former configuration proves closed. This indicates that a neurobiological explanation, while accurate in its mechanics, does not capture the depth of the subjective felt experience. The loss of an idea – particularly one that was intuitively significant yet not yet fully formed – does not merely disrupt the cognitive process, but affects the very structure of the thinking “Self”. We do not merely lose information; we lose connection with ourselves in the moment. This is why an ordinary cognitive phenomenon is experienced as an existential wound: an idea that was just part of our intention vanishes, leaving a sense of emptiness, as if something essential has slipped away. This is not irritation, but depletion, for it is not only memory that is disrupted, but authorship, integrity, and meaning. The individual experiences the loss not merely of an idea, but of the possibility of being oneself in thought – provoking an anxiety that resists rational consolation. At this frontier, the mechanical transforms into the metaphysical. The brain is merely an instrument, yet the experience of loss belongs to the self. It then becomes evident that biology does not explain everything: behind neural decay lies a psychic act of self-protection, namely the repression of that which might alter the equilibrium of the “Self”. At this point, the study moves to the second level – the psychological – where the mechanics of forgetting transform into the drama of inner resistance.

Thus, whereas neurobiology describes the mechanism of loss, psychology reveals its inner drama. An idea that vanishes is not merely a product of a memory lapse, but a victim of an internal conflict. When consciousness approaches the boundary where a new idea could alter its structure, an invisible “guardian” is activated – the system of psychological defenses. At this moment, it is not the brain that blocks access, but the psyche that closes the doors.

It is likely that Freud would have characterised this phenomenon as repression – a process in which the unconscious blocks access to a thought perceived as threatening to

the integrity of the Ego (Freud, 1926/1959). However, in our case, it is not a matter of classical trauma, but rather of a developmental micro-trauma – a subtle, almost imperceptible moment in which a new idea could have expanded the boundaries of the “Self”, were it not for the fear of one’s own change. Within each of us operates an invisible perfectionist – an internal censor that prevents an idea from appearing in an imperfect form. Its nature is the fear of error, the shame before the chaos of the unfinished. It does not edit – it executes: destroying the germ of meaning before it has a chance to sprout. Paradoxically, it is precisely the perfectionist, born from the desire for control, that becomes the executioner of the creative impulse. In this context, the disappearance of an idea is not a random casualty of distracted attention, but a symbolic act of self-punishment.

The shadow aspect of the personality, which Jung described as the totality of repressed, unacknowledged, or conflicting aspects of the “Self”, plays a key role in this process (Jung, 1921/1971; Jung, 1951/1979). It does not destroy a thought, but conceals it within the unconscious, where it transforms into an echo – a psychic resonance manifesting as anxiety, a sense of incompleteness, or an intuitive signal: “something important existed – and has vanished.” This echo is a sign that the thought is not permanently forgotten, but merely repressed, awaiting the moment when the Ego matures sufficiently for its integration. From a Jungian perspective, the repressed is not lost forever – it is preserved within the Shadow and can be reclaimed through the process of individuation, that is, the expansion of consciousness through the acceptance of the unacknowledged.

In this context, resilience emerges not merely as a psychological resource, but as a prerequisite for the Ego to mature sufficiently to encounter the Shadow. As demonstrated by research on the psychological rehabilitation of military personnel (Synhaivska & Sokur, 2025), the capacity for self-acceptance, the development of internal control, and cognitive flexibility are key factors in adaptation following traumatic experiences. In the

psychoanalytic dimension, these characteristics may be understood as prerequisites for the integration of the repressed – that which was unacceptable but retained within the psyche as potential. Only a matured Ego is capable not merely of enduring the encounter with the Shadow, but of transforming it into a source of renewed wholeness.

The final stage of this process is meaning-making – the formation of a new value system in which the Shadow is no longer a threat, but a source of depth. As evidenced by

research on rehabilitation (Synhaivska & Sokur, 2025), it is precisely the reconstruction of the value-meaning domain that enables veterans not merely to adapt, but to reinterpret their experiences and integrate them into a new identity. From a Jungian perspective, this corresponds to the concluding stage of individuation – when the unacknowledged becomes accepted, and the lost is transformed. That which was forgotten does not return literally, but is reborn – in a new form, with new meaning, and as a new “Self”.

Table 1

The Internal Pathway for the Integration of a Repressed Idea

Stage	Psychological dynamics	Theoretical source	Symptom / Signal	Transformational potential
Repression	Unconscious blocking of a threatening thought	Freud (1926/1959)	Loss of an idea, tension, avoidance	Protection of the Ego’s integrity
Shadow	Retention of the unacknowledged in the unconscious	Jung (1921/1971; 1951/1979)	Echo, anxiety, intuitive feeling	Anticipation of integration
Resilience	Maturation of the Ego for the encounter with the Shadow	Synhaivska & Sokur (2025)	Self-acceptance, internal control	Readiness for integration
Integration	Acceptance of the repressed as part of the “Self”	Jung (1928/1954b)	Reduction of internal resistance	Expansion of consciousness
Meaning-making	Reconstruction of the value system	Synhaivska & Sokur (2025); Jung (1951/1979)	Emergence of a new identity	Transformation of loss into depth

Thus, forgetting may function as an act of self-protection, that is, an unconscious choice between stability and transformation. A person intuitively “erases” that which threatens to disrupt their habitual internal architecture. This may be an idea that contradicts established beliefs, or an insight that reveals an overly painful truth. We do not repress information, but the potential to become otherwise.

In this sense, the phenomenon of the “lost idea” reveals the deep dynamics of the psyche: the fear of the new within the Self. It

is an internal conflict between the Seeker and the Guardian – between the part that strives for expansion and the part that protects stability. Herein lies the psychological paradox: forgetting becomes simultaneously a defeat and a victory – we lose the content, yet preserve ourselves.

But is this truly “preservation”? Or is it rather a form of stasis, a loss of potential for development? When we learn to attend not to the thought itself, but to its disappearance, we begin to perceive a deeper truth – not about memory, but about fear. In this way, a

phenomenon that once seemed a mere cognitive error transforms into a mirror of the inner drama.

The next level is existential. It opens an even broader horizon: what does it mean to “lose an idea” if thought itself constitutes the foundation of our selfhood? Can we possess that which constantly eludes us, being born not so much within us as through us?

There are ideas that we do not forget – they forget us. The moment an idea disappears may not be a failure of memory, but a gesture of being that does not wish to be grasped. A thinking person always stands between possession and loss: we strive to be the authors of our own thoughts, yet increasingly it becomes apparent that thought does not belong to us. As Heidegger (1954) notes in *Was heißt Denken?*, thought comes to us as an event, as a calling, rather than as a product of will. We do not create thought – we respond to its call.

When we attempt to appropriate it, it vanishes. In this way, forgetting becomes a reminder of the fundamental impossibility of being the absolute author. This is the ontological modesty of thought: it occurs through us, but not by us. “Loss of an idea” is not merely a psychic malfunction, but an experience of the boundary where intellect encounters the transcendent. For this reason, such a loss is experienced painfully – it touches our sense of control, of the “I” that thinks, governs, and possesses.

Frankl (1946), in *Man’s Search for Meaning*, wrote that meaning is always greater than the subject: it is not created, but revealed. Perhaps the same applies to an idea. It comes when we are ready, and leaves us when we attempt to hold it. We lose it not because our memory is weak, but because our “I” is too strong. Only by relinquishing the claim to ownership can we once again perceive that which has disappeared.

This paradox is well illustrated by Lacanian theory of the subject, split by language. As Lacan (1966) writes in *Écrits*, we think through a language that exceeds us: the “I” is merely the place where language speaks. In this context, “loss of an idea” is not an error, but a manifestation of a deeper truth: thought

is never entirely our own. Each idea functions as a signal from the depths of the unconscious, like a beam passing through the darkness of the linguistic structure. At times, this beam does not reach the surface, dissolving in the darkness – not because it vanishes, but because it cannot be articulated.

It appears that Jung (1959) would describe this process as an encounter with the Shadow – that part of ourselves that knows more than we can bear. It is the Shadow that preserves the “lost ideas” – those that do not fit within the boundaries of our Ego. Each instance of forgetting, in essence, is an act of temporary exile: the idea has not yet lost its energy; it simply cannot be assimilated by consciousness. We lose an idea when we are not ready to accept its consequences.

The existential drama of this process lies in the fact that a person appears not as the master of thoughts, but as the space in which thoughts live and disappear. Herein lies both the tragedy and the freedom. We cannot control the birth or death of ideas, but we can be present in this movement, without resistance. In this way, forgetting ceases to be a defeat and becomes part of the rhythm of thinking – like inhalation and exhalation.

Perhaps an idea does not vanish, but merely changes its form. It moves into the subtext, into the pause, into silence. It is precisely there, in the quiet, that the deepest thinking occurs. Yalom (1980), in *Existential Psychotherapy*, wrote that a person becomes themselves when they dare to confront the void. “Loss of an idea” is such an encounter: a moment when we face a void that does not destroy, but purifies.

Everything that disappears leaves a trace. Even an idea that we did not have time to record continues to live in the micro-movements of consciousness – in mood, in the subtle tone of voice, in a gaze that suddenly lingers on something seemingly insignificant. The psyche loses nothing without a trace: it transforms. Therefore, the task is not to recover the “lost content of an idea”, but to accept that an idea that has dissolved has already fulfilled its function. Its disappearance is not a loss, but a form of completion. It has not gone, but

moved into silence, into the subtext, into the inner space, where it continues to operate – not as content, but as an impulse toward reinterpretation.

In humanistic psychology, this process can be described as a movement from control to acceptance. As Rogers (1961) notes in *On Becoming a Person*, personal growth occurs when an individual ceases to resist their own experience. At that point, ideas cease to be “objects of possession” and become expressions of the living flow of consciousness. The therapeutic interpretation of forgetting involves a shift in focus: not “how to recover a lost idea”, but “what was it attempting to express before disappearing”. At times, its disappearance constitutes the message itself. It is not merely the loss of an idea, but a form of inner gesture, a way in which the psyche signals tension, a boundary, or the need for reinterpretation. An idea may remain incomplete not because it is weak, but because the unconscious is not yet ready to assimilate it. Hence, the therapeutic question is not one of restoration, but of recognition: *what exactly sought to manifest itself through this loss?*

In this context, therapy emerges as a process of reinterpreting the relationships between memory, identity, and presence. In Yalom’s (1989) work *Love’s Executioner*, the thesis is presented that true healing begins not when a patient recalls, but when they allow themselves to forget – that is, when they cease to cling to the painful structures of the past. The same applies to thinking: liberation from the compulsive drive to “remember” opens the possibility for new creative action.

“Loss of an idea”, if experienced attentively, becomes a point of contact with the deep “Self”. This is a return not to a specific

idea, but to oneself as the subject of thought. In this sense, forgetting is not a loss, but a therapeutic act of purification: like the pause between inhalation and exhalation, providing the possibility for the birth of a new idea. The ability to accept loss constitutes one of the highest forms of intellectual maturity. Indeed, the very structure of consciousness encompasses a rhythm of emergence and disappearance, presence and absence, which shapes the living fabric of thought.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, this movement can be described as the process of integrating the Shadow – the return of the repressed to the structure of consciousness. A “forgotten idea” is not merely a loss, but a symbolic component of the unconscious awaiting recognition. When we cease to blame ourselves for forgetting, we begin to discern what previously remained unacknowledged. Herein lies the ethical dimension of therapy: learning not only to remember, but also to forget with dignity. After all, forgetting is not always a betrayal of memory; at times, it is the only means of preserving it.

Within this space, neuroscience, psychoanalysis, and philosophy converge, forming a multidimensional map of human consciousness. Neuroscience reveals how we forget; psychoanalysis explains why; and phenomenology addresses for what purpose. Only when these levels merge does the possibility of holistic understanding arise. Thought is not a linear process, but a pulsation between knowledge and the unknown, between word and silence.

Diagram 1 illustrates how the three disciplinary perspectives – neuroscience, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology – account for forgetting.




Fig.1. Three Approaches to Forgetting

Thus, the return of the lost does not imply the literal restoration of memory. Rather, it involves the re-establishment of one's relationship with consciousness – trust in its processes, acceptance of its limitations, and the belief that even that which has vanished continues to exist in another form. In this sense, an idea that was not recorded is not lost; it has passed into silence, from which a new one may one day emerge.

Conclusions. Thus, the phenomenon of the 'lost idea', which at first glance appears to be a random lapse in memory function, reveals itself at a deeper level as an event of existence – a confrontation of the subject with its own limits. This is not merely a cognitive pause, but a moment of truth in which consciousness recognises both its fragility and its creative potential. The loss of thought becomes a metaphor for the encounter between knowledge and the unknown, between control and acceptance, between the Ego that seeks to possess and Being that allows to exist.

At the neurobiological level, we observe how thought – this dynamic ensemble of neural connections – is prone to lapses, interruptions, and rewritings. Yet these mechanical “failures” often conceal the inner logic of the psyche, its striving for homeostasis. Psychoanalytic analysis reveals that forgetting is frequently not a defect, but a defence: the repression of an idea that might threaten an established identity. Here, an internal censor operates – the “perfectionist” within the superego structure, punishing imperfection and thereby depriving us of the possibility of being fully alive in our own thinking.

In this sense, developmental microtrauma resonates with the adaptive barrier experienced by military personnel upon returning to civilian life. As research shows (Synhaivska & Sokur, 2025), the internal restructuring required for the integration of new experiences is often blocked by a psyche striving for stability. The loss of familiar roles,

the need to reassess values, and the restoration of social connections – all create a tension akin to that which arises with the emergence of a new idea threatening to alter one's self-image. The idea does not vanish; it is repressed because the "Self" is not yet prepared to assimilate it.

The existential dimension reveals another truth: the 'loss of an idea' is not merely an internal conflict, but a challenge to our conception of authorship. After all, if an idea vanishes without submitting to our will, can we still call ourselves its owners? Here arises a radical question: who is the thinking subject – creator, conduit, or merely the one who listens to the inner voice of being?

In light of this analysis, it becomes evident that forgetting is not the opposite of memory. It is its shadow aspect, without which the renewal of consciousness is impossible. A person striving to "remember" is often contending not with the absence of an idea, but with their own resistance to change. The "lost idea" indicates a boundary where the old structure of the "Self" cannot accommodate new information, as it threatens its integrity. True restoration, therefore, does not lie in the retrieval of the idea's content, but in the readiness to be reborn – in a new mental form.

This transformation has a profoundly therapeutic character. Acceptance of the "lost idea" constitutes an act of inner reconciliation, allowing a person to move beyond the neurotic compulsion for control. In this sense, the phenomenon of the "lost idea" can be regarded as a model of a spiritual process, in which forgetting becomes a precondition for the birth of new meaning. Just as in nature decomposition lays the foundation for future growth, so too in consciousness does the letting go of a thought open the way for its rebirth.

Thus, the "loss of an idea" is not so much a cognitive error as an ontological

gesture: a reminder of our dependence on the living rhythm of consciousness, which breathes through forgetting and memory. We are not merely the authors of our ideas, but also the owners of the domain in which they are born, exist, and vanish. Perhaps the maturity of thought lies not in retaining every idea or notion, but in learning to release it with trust and hope that it will return, if it truly belonged to us.

Suggestions for Further Research.

Further research should be directed towards clarifying the mechanisms by which individual psychological characteristics, resilience, and the depth of existential reflection influence the processes of integrating repressed content, particularly in the context of the "loss of an idea" as a psycho-emotional and meaning-laden phenomenon. It would be valuable to examine age-related, gender-related, and experiential differences in the experience of the "lost thought" phenomenon, as well as its relationship with levels of self-acceptance, cognitive flexibility, and capacity for meaning-making.

An important avenue for further research is the expansion of the sample to ensure greater statistical validity, alongside the implementation of longitudinal studies to track the dynamics of changes in psycho-emotional states, PTSD symptomatology, and identity reconstruction processes over time. It is also advisable to develop and pilot adaptive psychotherapeutic and rehabilitative programmes, integrating cognitive-behavioural, trauma-focused, existential, and resource-oriented approaches, with subsequent evaluation of their effectiveness using standardised measures, particularly in addressing the "loss of an idea" phenomenon as an indicator of internal resistance and transformative potential.

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